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Abstract
We investigate leading by example in a public goods game in scenarios with
and without intergroup competition. Leading by example is implemented via a
sequential decision protocol. We examine both one-shot and repeated interaction
and make use of the strategy method to characterize followers' conditional responses
to the leader's contribution. The results show that only follower but not leader
behavior is aected by the introduction of intergroup competition. The change
in follower behavior is best described as an increase in cooperation which is not
conditional on the leader's decision. When groups interact repeatedly, we do not nd
that leading by example is able to foster cooperation by itself. It only signicantly
improves contributions when it is accompanied by intergroup competition.
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Eective leadership is an important element in modern organizations. It serves as a means
to motivate eort from personnel in circumstances of incomplete contracts or where formal
authority is lacking. Leading by example is, perhaps, the most basic form of leadership.
It comes in many forms: the CEO working for a symbolic salary of 1$ when his company
demands pay cuts from its employees, the foreman being the rst on the site and the
last to leave or union leaders joining the street protests. Historical examples outside for-
prot organizations include Martin Luther King's participation in the freedom marches
or Joseph Stalin's decision to stay in Moscow during World War II (Hermalin, 1998).
This study reports on an experiment in which we extend the research on leading by
example to a situation relevant to many organizations: a scenario of intergroup con
ict
within the rm. Intergroup con
ict occurs when the interests of two or more groups
are in opposition. This readily translates to the organizational context as groups, like
departments or work teams, compete over scarce resources imposed by limitations in
space, budget or labor supply. The notion of group con
ict is often exclusively associated
with detrimental consequences which may arise as rivals have the incentive to waste
resources for con
ict-related activities. It may, however, also be used to the benet of
the organization (de Dreu and van de Vliert, 1997).1 Examples include Oppenheimer's
use of competing groups in the Manhattan Project (Gosling, 1999) and within-rm R&D
competitions, e.g., at Samsung (Chen and Li, 2007).
The experimental literature examines leading by example in the environment of linear
public goods games { an experimental paradigm, which is often used to study team work.
Leading by example is implemented via a semi-sequential decision protocol. The leader
acts as the rst mover. His decision is revealed to the remaining group members who then
decide simultaneously on their contributions. The experimental literature on leading by
example includes, among others, Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003), G uth et al. (2007),
and Levati et al. (2007). These studies generally show that leaders are willing to give
good examples. Followers, however, do react only partially and undercut the leaders'
contributions. As a result, leading by example only weakly increases overall contributions
to the public good. The basic paradigm of leading by example has, e.g., been extended
to incorporate dierent forms of heterogeneity (Levati et al., 2007, Gl ockner et al., 2011),
1The term intergroup competition seems to capture this notion more convincingly than intergroup
con
ict. The literature, however, treats these terms as interchangeable and it does not seem possible to
act upon this issue in the present article.
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leadership (Haigner and Wakolbinger, 2010, Rivas and Sutter, 2011). None of the previous
studies, however, dealt with a situation involving more than one group.2
Intergroup competition has received attention in a number of disciplines. For an ex-
cellent review on the experimental research in social psychology, see Bornstein (2003). A
recent laboratory study in evolutionary biology is Puurtinen and Mappes (2008). Experi-
mental studies in economics include, e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), Gunnthorsdot-
tir and Rapoport (2006), Tan and Bolle (2007), and Abbink et al. (2010). The evidence
from all disciplines shows quite clearly that intergroup competition can lead to an increase
in intragroup cooperation in a large set of circumstances. The underlying mechanisms
root in both strategic as well as motivational sources. They relate to in-group favoritism
and social preferences { concepts closely linked with reciprocity which most likely is crucial
to leading by example. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.
We complement the existing literature in three ways. First, we generalize the paradigm
of leading by example to a scenario of intergroup competition. We examine both one-shot
and repeated interaction. The former abstracts from strategic considerations and allows
us to investigate leader and follower behavior in a clean environment. The latter accounts
for the fact that real life intergroup con
ict mostly entails multiple encounters. Second,
we use the strategy method when eliciting followers' decisions. This enables us to fully
characterize followers' types and to examine the change in conditional follower responses
when intergroup con
ict is introduced.3 Third, we elicit group identication and analyze
its relation to the eect of intergroup competition.
Our results for the one-shot interactions show that intergroup competition has dier-
ential eects on leader and follower behavior. While leaders are largely insensitive to the
presence of intergroup con
ict, followers display an increased willingness to cooperate.
This increase does not depend on the leaders' actions. When groups interact repeatedly,
we do not nd that leading be example is able to foster cooperation by itself. It only
signicantly improves contributions when it is accompanied by intergroup competition.
Our data does not support the conjecture that intergroup competition leads to higher
group identication.
2For theoretical and experimental work on leading by example with information asymmetries between
leaders and followers, see Hermalin (1998) and Potters et al. (2007).
3G achter et al. (2010) also elicits followers' choices via the strategy method, but in a two-person game.
In such a setup a follower's choice does no longer entail any behavioral uncertainty which is present in
our design. Their measurement is thus more closely related to the elicitation of conditional cooperative
attitudes (see, e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001).
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the experimental design, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses
Embedding a social dilemma in an intergroup con
ict aects individuals' decisions in
two important ways. First, it changes incentives. If groups enter a competition for an
exogenously given price as, e.g., in winner-takes-all or rent-seeking (or Tullock) contests,
cooperation becomes more protable because it increases the chances for winning the
prize (see, e.g., Bornstein et al., 1990, Abbink et al., 2010).
Intergroup con
ict has a second and purely motivational eect on intragroup coopera-
tion and we are exclusively interested in the latter.4 Its existence has been a long-standing
conjecture in social psychology (see, e.g., Messick and Brewer, 1983, Brown, 1988). Yet,
Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) were the rst to provide a clean experimental test.
They designed an experiment to compare behavior in a single group prisoner's dilemma
(PD) and in an intergroup prisoner's dilemma game (IPD). Both games were identical
with respect to their intragroup social dilemma structure. The IPD, however, models
two competing groups, where cooperation in any one of them in
icts a negative exter-
nal eect on the respective opponent. Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) report twice as
much cooperation in the IPD than in the PD. Since both games were identical with re-
spect to material incentives of individuals and groups, the authors attributed the eect to
purely motivational reasons. More specically, they state that the dierence in behavior
\[...] cannot be explained by assuming that subjects were motivated by self-interest, group-
interest, or some xed combination of both." (p. 64). Since, in the IPD, a cooperative
act benets the own group and hurts the out-group at the same time, a greater concern
for the in-group's outcome or spite toward the out-group remained possible explanations.
Halevy et al. (2008) presents evidence on this distinction. In their experiment participants
have the choice whether their cooperative act shall decrease the out-group's outcome in
addition to increasing the in-group's. The results show that the vast majority of partic-
ipants chooses not to hurt the out-group. In conjunction with the results in Bornstein
and Ben-Yossef (1994) this evidence strongly suggests that intergroup competition leads
to enhanced concerns for the in-group's overall outcome.
We implement intergroup competition in the same way as Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
4In fact, our experiment is expressly designed to abstract from the afore mentioned incentive eect.
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results in our one-shot encounters. It is more dicult to foresee behavior in the repeated
interaction setup as empirical results are mixed. Bornstein et al. (1996), e.g., nd that
the motivational eect of intergroup competition diminishes with repetition. We state
our rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. When interaction is one-shot, intergroup competition leads to an increase
in intragroup cooperation.
The motivational eect associated with intergroup competition might impact leading
by example. First, we expect that leaders contribute more to the public good if they
assign greater weight to the outcome of their group. Since we know from previous ex-
periments that followers' contribution decisions are positively correlated with those of
leaders, such a behavioral change would yield higher overall cooperation. Followers, in
turn, might be willing to reciprocate a leader's contribution more forcefully given that the
group's outcome gures more prominent for their decisions. Such a behavioral shift would
counteract the followers' general tendency to undercut leaders' contributions, which pre-
vious studies identied as the most serious obstacle for leading by example to eectively
increase cooperation.
An increased willingness to reciprocate leaders' examples is conceivable in dierent
forms. One possibility is that the enhanced cooperation in intergroup competition is as-
sociated with a greater concern for the group's success which is not conditional on the
decisions of other group members. In this case, we would expect that followers increase
their contributions to every possible leader decision by some xed amount. An alternative
would be that intergroup competition leads to an increased willingness to cooperate that
is conditional on the other group members' readiness to forego their individual monetary
interest as well. In other words, intergroup competition might lead to a greater tendency
for conditional cooperation. In this case, we would expect that followers' marginal re-
sponses to increases in leaders' contributions are strengthened in a scenario of intergroup
competition.5 Our use of the strategy method when eliciting followers' choices will help
to shed light on this issue. In summary, we state the following hypotheses with respect
to role-specic behavior:
5Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) explain the eect of leading by example by way of assuming conformist
follower types. In their model, an increased tendency for conditional cooperation would translate to a
higher degree of conformism.
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group competition than when it is not.
Hypothesis 3. Followers react more cooperatively to the leader's example when the social
dilemma is embedded in intergroup competition.
According to Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), the motivational eect of intergroup
con
ict might be mediated by group identication. Social identity theory (or SIT), as
introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1986), promotes the idea, that actions are in
uenced
by the social category of the decision maker. Key to SIT are the assumptions that people
strive for a positive self-concept, that their group-membership can provide them with a
value which contributes positively or negatively to their self-concept and that these eval-
uations come from favorable or unfavorable comparisons with other groups (see Tajfel
and Turner, 1986, p. 16). Not every possible comparison matters, however. Only if the
decision maker identies with a group, he will care about the outcome of a comparison.
Intergroup competition has the potential to aect personal attachment to a group as it
is said to serve \[:::] as a unit-forming factor, that enhances group identication [:::]"
(Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994, p. 64). Research on social identity has also picked
up in economics. A recent experiment by Chen and Li (2009) investigated the mecha-
nism underlying the eect of group identication. The results connect to the ndings in
Halevy et al. (2008). They demonstrate that social preferences may be aected by group
identication in that the likelihood for positive reciprocal and social welfare maximizing
actions increases. The original result in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated
several times (Probst et al., 1999, Baron, 2001, Tan and Bolle, 2007). None of these
studies directly tested whether the motivational eect of competition works through in-
creased group identication. By measuring identication, our results will shed light on
this possible mechanism.
3 Experimental design
3.1 The basic game
The basic game follows the taxonomy of a standard linear voluntary contribution mecha-
nism (Isaac et al., 1984). Participants interact in groups of N = 3 for t = 1;:::;T periods.
At the beginning of every period, each participant is given an endowment of E = 10 ECU
(Experimental Currency Units) which she can consume privately or contribute to a group
6
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ECU. Every ECU contributed to the group project benets every member of the group
 = 0:5 ECU. Thus, the payo for individual i in period t is given by




where ci;t is individual i's contribution to the public project in period t, Gi is the set of
members in individual i's group, and
P
j2Gi cj;t are the total (i.e., the sum of) contributions
to the public good in individual i's group in that period. Since  < 1, a pure money
maximizer's dominant choice is to contribute nothing to the group project. This result
holds for one-shot interactions and can be generalized to nitely repeated interactions
by means of backward induction if we assume rational monetary payo maximizers and
common knowledge. Socially optimal behavior, on the other hand, would prescribe full
contribution to the public good, since N   > 1.
3.2 Implementing leading by example and intergroup competi-
tion
In the basic game, interaction takes place simultaneously. Leading by example is imple-
mented by means of a semi-sequential decision protocol: One member of the group is
randomly appointed to be the \leader," who decides about his contribution to the group
project before the other group members do. The leader's decision is communicated to
the two other group members, or the \followers," who then decide simultaneously about
their contributions.6 Since, in a last period, contributing nothing is still the dominant
choice for followers, the rst mover is also always better o contributing zero. I.e., as-
suming monetary payo maximizers, the semi-sequential move structure does not alter
the behavioral predictions.
Our implementation of intergroup competition follows Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994).
It involves real payo consequences but is designed to preserve the intragroup incentive
structure of the public goods game.7 Pairs of groups are formed and after participants
decided on their contributions, the groups' total contributions are compared in every
pair. This comparison takes place after each period. The group with the higher total
6The instructions used neutral wording: leaders were described as \rst movers."
7The most signicant deviation from the setup in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) is that the indi-
vidual decision to cooperate is no longer dichotomous.
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transfer equals 0.3 times the absolute dierence in total contributions between the oppos-
ing groups. Its benets and costs are shared equally by the respective groups' members.
In order to account for the fact that an individual's marginal per capita return (MPCR) of
contributing 1 ECU is increased by  = 0:1 due to the transfer, we reduce the return from
the group project to c =     = 0:4. In the treatments with intergroup competition,
individual i's payo in period t can be summarized by
i;t = 25   ci;t + 0:4 
P
j2Gi










where G i is the set of members in the group which opposes individual i's. If we as-
sume common knowledge of payo maximizer preferences and rationality, full free-riding
remains the theoretical prediction also with intergroup competition, since the MPCR is
still below unity.8 Moreover, we control for the overall MPCR ( = c +  = 0:5), such
that the marginal incentives to contribute are identical in all conditions. This is necessary
since a higher MPCR empirically yields higher contributions (Ledyard, 1995) and would
thus constitute a possible confounding eect.9 Since the transfer constitutes a zero-sum
transaction, the overall eciency for pairs of groups is reduced in treatments with in-
tergroup competition. Preferences for eciency (see, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004)
would therefore predict contributions to be lower than in the case of isolated groups. This
eect runs counter our hypothesis that intergroup con
ict promotes intragroup cooper-
ation. Note that, unlike in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), socially optimal behavior
would still prescribe full contribution as c  3 > 1. This corresponds to our view that
competition can be eciency-enhancing in an organizational context.
3.3 The experiment's structure
The experiment is divided into two stages. The rst stage addresses sequential decisions
with and without intergroup competition. The two treatments are labeled S1-SeqC and
S1-SeqNC, respectively, and are played between-subjects. Interaction in this stage is one-
shot (i.e., T = 1) in order to abstract from potential eects from reputation building
(Kreps et al., 1982). In this one period, leaders move rst but instead of communicating
8Other ways of implementing competition include awarding xed exogenous prices (see, e.g., Nalban-
tian and Schotter, 1997) or Tullock-like contests (see, e.g., Abbink et al., 2010). These approaches do,
however, yield Nash equilibria with non-negative contributions.
9A control for the overall MPCR is missing, e.g., in Puurtinen and Mappes (2008).
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conditional responses to each possible contribution by the leader.10 After collecting contri-
bution choices, we additionally elicit the participants' identication with their group and
their perception about the competitiveness of the situation.11 Participants were informed
about the decisions in the rst stage only after the end of the second stage to prevent
behavioral spill-overs across the two stages and in order to keep the group identication
elicitation clean.
The second stage contains a 22 between-subjects design with simultaneous vs. se-
quential decisions as the rst dimension and intergroup competition vs. no intergroup
competition as the second. The treatments are labeled S2-SimNC and S2-SimC for the
simultaneous move conditions without and with intergroup competition and, accordingly,
S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC for the sequential move conditions. In all second stage treat-
ments participants interact in a (T =) 10 periods repeated partners design with feedback
after every period. The feedback contains information about individual contributions in a
participant's own group and, in case of competition, the total contributions of the oppos-
ing group. We also elicit rst order action beliefs about the average contribution in the
own group (excluding the leader) and the average contribution in the competing group,
where applicable. These beliefs are incentivised following the procedure in Fischbacher
and G achter (2010): if the expectation diers by 0 (1) ECU from the rounded average
contribution, the participant receives 3 (2) ECU. In all other cases the participant receives
nothing.12
Every subject participates in both stages of the experiment. We keep group compo-
sition and the matching into pairs of groups constant across stages.13 All groups that
participated in treatment S1-SeqNC are divided equally to continue either in treatment
S2-SimNC or in S2-SeqNC. All pairs of groups that participated in treatment S1-SeqC
are divided equally to continue either in treatment S2-SimC or in S2-SeqC. This proce-
dure insures that participants experience either the competition or the no competition
environment but not both. Whenever decisions are recorded sequentially in the second
10It has been argued that employing the strategy method facilitates (cold) decisions based on reason
rather than (hot) decisions based on emotions. The empirical evidence on this issue is, however, inconclu-
sive (see, e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2011). If follower behavior is based on emotions and if competition
in
uences those emotions, our use of the strategy method might bias the results toward nding smaller
behavioral dierences across treatments.
11See the procedures for the exact wording of the questions.
12G achter and Renner (2010) report that this form of belief elicitation can aect contribution decisions.
We are, however, mainly interested in treatment dierences and it is not obvious why the belief elicitation
should aect behavior dierently in dierent treatments.
13Participants learn this not until the beginning of the second stage.
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known to the participants. Table 1 summarizes the structure of the experiment.
Table 1: The experimental treatments
Stage 1 Stage 2
Treatment S1-SeqNC S1-SeqC S2-SimNC S2-SeqNC S2-SimC S2-SeqC
Sequential
decisions
X X { X { X
Intergroup
competition
{ X { { X X
Strategy method
for second mover
X X { { { {
One-shot X X { { { {
10 periods { { X X X X
Belief elicitation { { X X X X
# sessions 4 7 2 2 3 4
# groups 25 52 13 12 24 28
# subjects 75 156 39 36 72 84
Note: A checkmark (dash) means that a design feature is (not) present in the respective treatment.
The matching across stages is such that participants of treatment S1-SeqNC continue either with
treatment S2-SimNC or S2-SeqNC and that those who participated in S1-SeqC continue either with
treatment S2-SimC or S2-SeqC.
Participants were paid according to their decisions in only one of the two stages. This
method prevents the possibility of hedging behavior across stages. Payment for the rst
stage equals the earnings according to the contribution decisions. Payment for the second
stage equals the sum of the earnings from the contribution decision and those for the
accuracy of beliefs in one randomly selected period.14
3.4 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the
experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany.
The participants were undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schiller University Jena.
They were recruited using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004). Upon arrival, participants
were seated at visually separated computer terminals. The instructions were divided
14Paying only one randomly chosen period theoretically controls for wealth eects on risk attitudes (Lee,
2008). Paying both the contribution decision and the belief statement in principle allows for hedging risks
between these two activities. Blanco et al. (2010), however, investigate this issue in a sequential prisoner's
dilemma game and nd no evidence for such behavior.
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each stage.15 All instructions were read aloud. The rst set announced the experiment's
division into two stages but did not specify further information about the second stage.
It was common knowledge that only one stage would randomly be selected for payment.
Before the start of the rst stage, subjects' understanding was tested by means of a set
of control questions. Participants' questions were answered privately at the their seats.
The payo relevant stage was determined via a coin toss at the end of the experiment.
If the second stage was selected, the payo relevant period was determined by drawing a
ball from an urn, which contained 10 balls numbered from 1 to 10. Both random draws
were performed by one subject and applied to all participants in a session. The subject
was chosen based on an experimenter's draw from a second urn. To be as credible as
possible, all draws were performed publicly.
To measure perceived competitiveness and identication participants were asked to
rate their agreement to specic statements on 7 point Likert-scales (1=\not at all" to
7=\very much"). Perceived competitiveness was measured using the statement \I per-
ceived the situation among groups to be very competitive." The items measuring iden-
tication were taken from Leach et al. (2008) and read \I feel committed to [In-group],"
\I am glad to be [In-group]," \I feel solidarity with [In-group]," and \It is pleasant to be
[In-group]." Groups were identied with an individual color.
All sessions were conducted between September and December 2010. The number
of sessions, groups and subjects per treatment are summarized in Table 1. Overall, 231
subjects participated in the experiment. Sessions lasted between one and a half and two
hours. Given the exchange rate of 0.80 euro cents per ECU, subjects earned on average
12.70 euro, ranging from 6.50 euro to 21.80 euro.
4 Results
Results are going to be presented as follows. First we provide a manipulation check.
Next, we report on dierences in leader and follower behavior with and without intergroup
competition using rst stage data. Afterward, we focus on the results for the repeated
interactions in the second stage.
15All sets of instructions can be found in Appendix B.
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We implemented intergroup competition via a transfer between groups. In order to check
whether the manipulation was successful, we compare the perceived competitiveness (mea-
sured on a Lickert scale from 1=\not at all" to 7=\very much") across conditions in stage
1. Since stage 1 does not include any feedback, every participant's response can be treated
as an independent observation. With 75 and 156 observations and means of 2.8 and 4.2
for S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, respectively, the dierence is highly signicant (p < 0:01,
Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided). We are thus condent that we successfully manipu-
lated the perception about the environment. Next we test the conjecture that competition
yields higher identication with the in-group. We calculate each individual's mean iden-
tity score as the average response to all four items. Comparing conditions S1-SeqNC and
S1-SeqC, the mean identity scores are virtually identical at 3.65 (p = 0:82, Wilcoxon rank
sum test, two-sided).16 This provides an indication that intergroup competition might
aect behavior in other ways than by inducing in-group identication. On the individ-
ual level the measures of identication and competitiveness are correlated in S1-SeqC
(Spearman's  = 0:35, p < 0:01) but not in S1-SeqNC ( = 0:12, p = 0:29). Over the
full sample the Spearman correlation coecient is  = 0:26. While this correlation is
signicant (p < 0:01), its magnitude points to a rather weak interdependence of perceived
competitiveness and group identication.
4.2 One-shot interaction
Overall contributions. We begin the analysis examining average group behavior. The
rst stage involves a pure one-shot interaction. However, since followers' decisions are
conditional on those of leaders, each group constitutes the basis for one independent
observation. This leaves us with 25 and 52 independent observations for S1-SeqNC and
S1-SeqC, respectively. A group's average contribution is calculated as the mean of the
leader's contribution and the two followers' actual contributions. The latter are those
conditional choices of followers which correspond to the leader's actual decision. Following
our rst hypothesis, we expect higher contributions with intergroup competition. The
mean contributions are depicted in the rst two bars in Figure 1, panel a. They amount to
3.84 ECU in S1-SeqNC and 4.53 ECU in S1-SeqC. The dierence is signicant (p = 0:049,
Wilcoxon rank sum test, one-sided), which conrms our expectation. This yields our rst
16There are no signicant dierences for responses to any of the single items.
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(b) Followers’ average conditional responses
Figure 1: Average contributions in stage 1
result:
Result 1. Three person groups consisting of one leader (rst mover) and two followers
(second movers) contribute more to a public good when the social dilemma is nested in an
intergroup con
ict.
Leader and follower behavior. To what extend can this eect be attributed to dierences
in leader and follower behavior with and without intergroup competition? Bars 3 { 6 in
Figure 1, panel a, depict the role-specic contributions for both experimental conditions.
Hypothesis 2 postulates higher contributions from leaders in the presence of intergroup
competition. Bars 3 and 4, however, suggest that leaders' choices remain unaected
by competition This impression is corroborated by a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test
(p = 0:35). How do followers react? Visual inspection suggests that followers' actual con-
tributions are higher in S1-SeqC than in S1-SeqNC. We use a Wilcoxon rank sum test for
statistical analysis. Since, in each group, both followers' actual contributions depend on
the same leader decision, we calculate their average as one independent observation. Us-
ing the resulting 25 and 52 observations for S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, respectively, the test
conrms that intergroup competition leads to higher follower contributions (p = 0:023,
Wilcoxon rank sum test, one-sided). In connection with the observation that leaders'
contributions are seemingly insensitive to intergroup con
ict, this nding supports Hy-
pothesis 3. A leader's example is followed more closely if the social dilemma is embedded
in intergroup competition.
Followers' conditional responses. The dierences in followers' actual contributions could
be driven by heterogeneity in leaders' choices which is not captured by their average. The
13
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the average vectors by experimental condition.17 The monotonically upward sloping lines
clearly show that followers on average react positively to an increase in the leader's contri-
bution. Nonetheless, the most critical result from previous studies on leading by example
proves to be robust: followers tend to undercut the leaders' contributions. This can be
seen when comparing the average vectors to that of a hypothetical, perfect conditional fol-
lower depicted by the dotted line. It is only for small (<3 ECU) leader contributions that
followers contribute the same as or more than leaders. The gure suggests furthermore
that followers sustain systematically higher contributions under intergroup competition.
We rst investigate this issue by means of the average conditional response which can
be used as a proxy for the average overall willingness to follow a leader's example. The
averages amount to 3.17 ECU in S1-SeqNC and 3.75 ECU in S1-SeqC, where the gures
are based on 50 and 104 independent observations, respectively, one for each follower.
The dierence is small but statistically signicant (p = 0:039, Wilcoxon rank sum test,
one-sided), which indicates that followers' average responses are higher under intergroup
competition. Next, we perform an individual regression on each follower's vector of con-
ditional choices and compare the resulting slopes across conditions. This measure can
be used to investigate the followers' average marginal responsiveness, as higher values
indicate that the followers react more strongly to changes in the leaders' decisions. The
mean slopes amount to 0.34 and 0.35 in S1-SeqNC and S1-SeqC, which conrms that
followers on average react positively but far from perfectly to a change in the leader's
contribution. A Wilcoxon rank sum test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the mean
slopes come from the same underlying distribution (p = 0:78, two-sided). The dierence
in followers' average contributions is thus not re
ected by steeper reaction functions with
respect to the leader's examples. On average, followers rather seems to increment their
contribution by an amount which is not conditional on what the leader does. Evidence
in support of this conjecture comes from a Wilcoxon rank sum test that compares the
followers' predicted responses for the average contribution of a leader (i.e., 5 ECU). We
use this measure as a proxy for the constant part of the followers' response functions. The
test rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% signicance level (p = 0:08, two-sided). The
evidence on role-specic behavior is summarized by:
Result 2. The presence of intergroup competition does not aect the contribution behavior
17The average conditional choice vectors are obtained by calculating the followers' mean response for
each possible leader contribution.
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best described as an increase in the willingness to contribute which is not conditional on
the leader's decision.
There is considerable heterogeneity in how followers react to leaders' contributions.
As this study is the rst to use the strategy method on followers' choices, we are able
to provide a more complete picture of these patterns. We categorize followers into ve
distinct groups according to the pattern of their conditional responses. The rst group are
strict non-contributors (SNC), who contribute exactly zero ECU for every possible leader
decision.18 Unconditional contributors (UC) do also not condition on the leader's decision
but contribute strictly positive amounts. Conditional followers (CF) are characterized by
upward sloping conditional response vectors. Their vectors of conditional choices either
increase monotonically with the leader's contribution or exhibit a positive and highly
signicant (p<0.01) Spearman correlation coecient.19 The fourth group are hump-shaped
followers (HSF) who react positively to better examples only up to some specic leader
contribution. Beyond this threshold, they react negatively.20 The last group are reverse
conditional followers (RCF) who contribute less the more the leader contributes.21 Such
a pattern might re
ect a motivation to supply some xed amount of the public good as a
group. A higher leader contribution would lower the burden to contribute for the follower,
which implies a downward sloping pattern. The group no category (NC) subsumes all
remaining followers. Table 2 depicts the observed relative frequencies for each follower
category. It is evident that conditional followers constitute the largest group. Strict non-
contributors, reverse conditional followers and hump-shaped followers mark the second,
third and forth most frequently observed categories. Unconditional contributors are rarely
observed. Note that about one fourth of all followers does not fall into any category. This
is partly due to our strict requirement on the signicance of the Spearman correlation
coecient.22 Comparing the distributions of types across treatments, we nd them to be
18We prefer this term to free-riders as the latter is already established and describes an actor who
contributes nothing independently of the decisions of everyone else in the group (see, e.g. Fischbacher
et al., 2001).
19These criteria mirror those used in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and G achter (2010) for
a public goods game with simultaneous decisions.
20The decisive criterion is a highly signicant positive Spearman correlation coecient for choices
smaller or equal to the threshold and a negative and highly signicant coecient for choice above the
threshold.
21The conditional responses either monotonically decrease with higher leader contributions or exhibit
a negative and highly signicant Spearman rank correlation coecient.
22A relaxation of this requirement yields more observations for conditional followers, reverse conditional
followers and hump-shaped followers. Results are available on request.
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Treatment SNC UC CF RCF HSF NC # obs
No competition (S1-SeqNC) 10.0 6.0 46.0 8.0 6.0 24.0 50
Competition (S1-SeqC) 10.6 2.9 40.4 8.7 6.7 30.8 104
Total 10.4 3.9 42.2 8.5 6.5 28.6 154
Note: Abbreviations: SNC = strict non-contributors; UC = unconditional contributors; CF
= conditional followers; HSF = hump-shaped followers; RCF = reverse conditional followers;
NC = no category.
very similar in both conditions. A one-sided Fisher exact test does not reveal a signicant
dierence in the distribution of types (p = 0:89). Pairwise comparisons for each individual
category also do not indicate any dierences in the relative frequencies (the smallest p-
value is p = 0:25 for no category, one-sided). Intergroup competition thus does not
seem to have an in
uence on the distribution of patterns with which followers react to
leaders' examples. Figure 2 displays the average contribution vectors by follower category
for both experimental conditions. It clearly shows the distinct, type-specic patterns of
conditional responses. The gure indicates furthermore that the increase in followers'
average conditional responses which is associated with intergroup competition (see Result
2) is mainly due to unconditional contributors, reverse conditional contributors and those
who cannot be categorized.23 In contrast, conditional followers display almost identical
average conditional response vectors in both experimental conditions. We summarize as
follows:
Result 3. Followers can be classied into several types according to their conditional
responses to leaders' examples. While almost half are conditional followers, we also ob-
serve strict non-contributors, unconditional contributors, reverse conditional followers,
and hump-shaped followers who each account for a minor percentage of the observations.
The distribution of types does not depend on the presence of intergroup competition.
4.3 Repeated interaction
Investigating one-shot interactions allows for valuable insights as it abstracts from strate-
gic behavior. Real life social dilemmas such as team work situations, however, are often
marked by repeated interaction which allows for reputation building or reciprocity con-
cerns. In this section, we extend our analysis to repeated play using data from the second
23Wilcoxon rank sum tests that compare followers' average conditional responses between S1-SeqNC
and S1-SeqC, however, do not reveal statistically signicant dierences for any single follower type.
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Figure 2: Followers' average conditional responses by follower category
stage of the experiment. Most of the analysis in this section is based on independent ob-
servations. Due to the feedback between periods, the unit of an independent observation
are group averages in case of isolated groups and averages of pairs of groups in case of
intergroup competition.
Treatment eects. Figure 3 depicts the time series of average contributions for each
treatment. Treatment S2-SimNC replicates standard ndings closely as contributions
start at around 50% of the endowment in the rst period and decline steadily to 20%
of the endowment in the last period. Contributions in S2-SimC are higher than without
competition in every period but show the same decline over time. Both treatments with
sequential decisions show higher cooperation rates than the respective simultaneous move
conditions. While this improvement is only visible for periods 4 to 10 when comparing
S2-SeqNC to S2-SimNC, it is sustained over the whole course of the experiment for the
treatments with intergroup competition.
In order to assess how the treatments aect overall cooperation, we average contri-
bution over all ten periods. Table 3 provides the relevant descriptive statistics, based
17
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Figure 3: Average group contributions over time
on independent observations. Mean and median contributions indicate what Figure 3 al-
ready suggested: intergroup competition seems to foster intragroup cooperation. Pairwise
two-sided Wilcoxon rank sum tests, however, fail to reject the null hypothesis that contri-
butions come from the same underlying distribution both for simultaneous (p = 0:18) and
for sequential decisions (p = 0:14). Thus, while intergroup competition leads to higher
contributions in our (sequential move) one-shot interactions, this does not prove to be
robust in repeated play.24 In order to assess whether we nd the eect of intergroup
competition in our overall data set, we pool the data for the simultaneous and sequential
treatments. Comparing independent observations, we nd the dierence to be statistically
signicant (p = 0:036, Wilcoxon rank sum test, two-sided).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: average contributions over all 10 periods based on inde-
pendent observation
Treatment Mean Median St. Dev. # Indep. obs.
S2-SimNC 3.6 3.4 1.96 13
S2-SeqNC 4.4 5.1 2.83 12
S2-SimC 4.6 4.5 1.71 12
S2-SeqC 6.1 6.5 1.59 14
Does leading by example yield an increase in cooperation? Figure 3 and Table 3
indicate that sequential decisions tend to elicit higher average contributions both with
24This result is in accordance with previous ndings. While Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), Baron
(2001) and Probst et al. (1999) show that cooperation is higher in the IPD than in the PD in experiments
where interaction is one-shot, this relation is not conrmed in Bornstein et al. (1996) who allow for
repetition.
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sum tests. While the test widely fails to reject the null hypothesis that contributions stem
from the same underlying distribution when there is no intergroup competition (p = 0:39),
the null hypothesis is rejected for the condition with intergroup competition (p = 0:045).
Thus, according to our data, leading by example only has a consistent positive eect
on contributions when it is combined with intergroup competition. This also drives the
signicant eect of sequential vs. simultaneous decisions (p = 0:037, Wilcoxon rank sum
test, two-sided) when the data is pooled over conditions. The non-signicance of the eect
of leading by example without intergroup competition runs counter to results in previous
studies. It is, however, not possible to attribute this discrepancy to a specic element
of the experimental design, since neither of the previous studies on leading by example
used three person groups, payed only one period in an repeated partners design or elicited
beliefs. The relative increase in contributions of 22% is, moreover, in the same order of
magnitude as the ones found in previous studies.25 We summarize as follows:
Result 4. Both, leading by example and intergroup competition, signicantly increase
contributions to the public good. The eect of leading by example is only signicant in the
condition with intergroup competition.
A noteworthy feature of the data is that the between (matching-) group variation in
cooperation does depend on the treatment. Figure provides 4 a graphical illustration.
The Box-Whisker plots indicate that the variation between groups is largest in S2-SeqNC
and smallest in S2-SeqC. In fact, S2-SeqNC shows the highest maximum and the lowest
minimum average group contribution among all treatments. Comparing the standard
deviations of average contributions between S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, this dierence is
signicant (p = 0:026, robust Levene's-test).26 It, thus, seems that intergroup competi-
tion does not only induce signicantly higher average contributions when decisions are
sequential but also a reduction in variance. The large variance in S2-SeqNC also ex-
plains why leading by example does not seem to have an eect without competition. It
is only with intergroup competition, that sequential decisions lead to consistently higher
contributions. This result complements the nding in Sausgruber (2009) that intergroup
comparison reduces between-group variance in cooperation.
25G uth et al. (2007), for instance, nd a weakly signicant increase of 33%.
26None of the other pairwise comparisons reveals signicant dierences for the respective standard
deviations.
19

























S2−SimNC S2−SeqNC S2−SimC S2−SeqC
Figure 4: Box-Whisker plots of average contributions over all 10 periods based on indepen-
dent observation. The boxes depict the 25 percentile, the median and the 75 percentile.
The whiskers mark the upper and lower adjacent values.
Interaction of leading by example and intergroup competition. The presence of the leader
yields a relative increase in contributions which amounts to 22% without competition
and to 39% with competition. The absolute increase, although being of a small order
of magnitude, roughly doubles. This suggests that leading by example and intergroup
competition may interact in their eects on overall contributions. In order to formally
test for such an interaction eect, we turn to regression analysis. Table 4 presents results
from two panel Tobit models, with subject-specic random intercepts.27 The rst model
regresses individual contributions on the two dummy variables Competition and Sequential
representing the experimental conditions, a linear trend, Period, as well as on Age and
Gender (male=1). The results partly mirror those obtained from the non-parametric tests
since both main eects turn out to be positive and signicant. In addition, we obtain
the expected negative trend over periods and a positive eect of age. The second model
augments the rst as it adds the interaction of both experimental conditions labeled as
Comp*Sequential. As expected, its point estimate is positive which indicates that the
eect of leading by example tends to be larger with intergroup competition. However, the
interaction is not signicantly dierent from zero. The inclusion of the interaction also
does not improve the model t (p = 0:19, LR-test). It is, thus, not possible to conclude
that leading by example and intergroup competition interact in a meaningful way in their
eects on overall cooperation.
Our estimations do not allow contribution decisions to be interdependent within the
same group and period. This, however, is likely to be the case as subjects condition their
27We report on Tobit models since the dependent variable, contribution, exhibits a large number of
corner solution outcomes. In fact, 32% of all observations are either 0 ECU or 10 ECU.
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Coecient 95% CI (BCa) Coecient 95% CI (BCa)
Competition 1.896 [0.32; 3.22] 1.213 [-0.50; 2.94]
Sequential 1.629 [0.44; 2.76] 0.703 [-1.91; 2.99]
Comp*Sequential { { 1.356 [-1.17; 4.64]
Period -0.212 [-0.34; -0.11] -0.212 [-0.34; -0.11]
Age -0.231 [-0.41; -0.09] -0.224 [-0.39; -0.09]
Gender -0.340 [-1.16; 0.28] -0.268 [-1.10; 0.46]
Constant 9.044 [5.33; 12.51] 9.307 [5.90; 13.26]
St. dev. random intercept 3.470 [2.90; 3.98] 3.458 [2.90; 3.99]
St. dev. residual 3.044 [2.73; 3.65] 3.044 [2.74; 3.65]
Log likelihood -4838.2 -4837.3
Note: The regressions are based on 2310 observations, 231 individuals, and 77 groups. 448 (293)
observations are left (right) censored. The bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) condence in-
tervals are based on non-parametric bootstraps with 500 replications. Sampling respects group
composition. , ,  indicate signicance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, based on the BCa con-
dence intervals.
behavior on the history of choices and because of the semi-sequential decision protocol in
the treatments with leading by example. In order to control for this issue, we estimate two
Tobit models with group-specic random intercepts and two linear mixed eects models
with nested random intercepts for groups and individuals.28 All previous results are shown
to be robust (see Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A).29 We summarize as follows:
Result 5. The interaction eect of leading by example and intergroup competition is
positive but not statistically signicant.
Leader and follower behavior. Figure 5 depicts the time series of leader and follower
contribution decisions for isolated groups (panel a) and intergroup competition (panel
b). Both graphs show clearly that second movers tend to follow the leaders' examples
over time. The Spearman correlation coecients between leader and average follower
contributions are  = 0:77 and  = 0:68 (both p < 0:01) for treatments S2-SeqNC
and S2-SeqC, respectively.30 At the same time, it is obvious that leaders consistently
contribute more than followers. This is corroborated by two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank
tests comparing leader and average follower contributions, averaged over periods (p =
28Due to a lack of implementation in Stata 11, we are not able to estimate Tobit models with nested
random intercepts for groups and individuals.
29The only dierence is that the coecient for Competition turns out to be signicant in the linear
mixed eects model that includes the interaction eect Comp*Sequential.
30We average the contributions of the two followers in one group in order to obtain one number which
can be compared to the leader's example.
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Figure 5: Leaders' and followers' contributions over time for the conditions without (panel
a) and with intergroup competition (panel b)
0:007 in S2-SeqNC and p < 0:01 in S2-SeqC). As a consequence, leaders' expected earnings
based on contribution decisions are lower than those of followers (p < 0:01 in S2-SeqNC
and p < 0:01 in S2-SeqC, two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test).31 These results are in
accordance with those from Section 4.2 and previous studies (see, e.g., Levati et al., 2007).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we experimentally investigate leading by example in a linear public goods
game in environments with and without intergroup competition. The advancement with
respect to the previous literature is two-fold.
First, we use the strategy method to characterize followers according to their condi-
tional responses to a leader's contributions. Our results suggest that the usually observed
undercutting of the leaders' examples may be the result of type-specic behavior. While
the largest group of participants are conditional followers who reciprocate a leader's exam-
ple, other types like strict non-contributors or hump-shaped followers on average undercut
the leader's contribution. A non-negligible fraction of followers even punishes better ex-
amples by means of reverse conditional behavior.
Second, we generalize the cooperation enhancing eect of leading by example to a
31Note that payment for the second part was based on one randomly chosen period and incorporated
payment for belief statements. The tests compare expected earnings for leaders and followers (averaged
per group) based on contributions, i.e., excluding those from belief statements.
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dierentiated eects on leading by example. While leader behavior remains largely un-
aected, followers behave more cooperatively in the presences of intergroup competition.
Their change behavior is best described as an increase in the willingness to cooperate
that is not conditional on the leader's contribution. Thus, while exemplary eort should
always be encouraged, it seems even more benecial when groups are in competition. The
latter statement, however, hinges on our specic parametrization in that a cooperative act
benets the in-group more than it hurts the out-group. The eects of leading by example
in destructive intergroup con
ict remain to be explored.
In this study, we deliberately abstract from the incentive aspects of intergroup compe-
tition in order to concentrate on its purely motivational eects. In real life, however, both
these eects are present simultaneously. A possibly fruitful avenue of research is thus to
investigate the interplay between leading by example and the structural eects of inter-
group con
ict. A leader's example might, e.g., constitute a powerful tool for equilibrium
selection in competitions that are associated with an exogenously given price (see, e.g.,
Erev et al., 1993, Abbink et al., 2010) or all-can-win competitions (Reuben and Tyran,
2010).
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A Additional empirical results




Coecient 95% CI (BCa) Coecient 95% CI (BCa)
Competition 2.029*** [0.63; 3.37] 1.300 [-0.26; 2.96]
Sequential 1.670*** [0.53; 2.78] 0.683 [-1.58; 2.97]
Comp*Sequential { { 1.461 [-1.12; 4.43]
Period -0.214*** [-0.34; -0.11] -0.214*** [-0.34; -0.11]
Age -0.100** [-0.20; -0.01] -0.100** [-0.20; -0.01]
Gender -0.484 [-1.14; 0.06] -0.479 [-1.14; 0.07]
Constant 6.147*** [3.66; 8.35] 6.608*** [4.27; 9.35]
St. dev. random intercept 3.104*** [2.66; 3.59] 3.087*** [2.67; 3.61]
St. dev. residual 3.290*** [2.94; 3.88] 3.290*** [2.94; 3.88]
Log likelihood -4842.0 -4841.6
Note: The regressions are based on 2310 observations, 231 individuals, and 77 groups. 448 (293)
observations are left (right) censored. The biased corrected and accelerated (BCa) condence
intervals are based on a non-parametric bootstrap with 500 replications. Sampling respects group
composition. , ,  indicate signicance at levels 1%, 5% and 10%, based on the BCa condence
intervals.
Table 6: Linear mixed eects regressions: main and interaction eects - robustness check
Dep. variable: contribution
Random intercepts: group, individual
(5) (6)
Coecient 95% CI (BCa) Coecient 95% CI (BCa)
Competition 1.379*** [0.42; 2.23] 1.098** [0.03; 2.16]
Sequential 1.285*** [0.53; 2.03] 0.906 [-0.63; 2.35]
Comp*Sequential { { 0.561 [-1.15; 2.59]
Period -0.154*** [-0.23; -0.09] -0.154*** [-0.23; -0.09]
Age -0.076** [-0.13; -0.01] -0.075** [-0.13; -0.01]
Gender -0.290* [-0.60; 0.01] -0.285* [-0.60; 0.02]
Constant 6.011*** [4.37; 7.32] 6.181*** [4.63; 7.61]
St. dev. random intercepts
group intercept 2.044*** [0.61; 0.82] 2.040*** [0.61; 0.82]
individual intercept 1.009 [-0.19; 0.08] 1.009 [-0.19; 0.08]
St. dev. residual 2.262*** [0.75; 0.90] 2.262*** [0.75; 0.90]
Log likelihood -5375.3 -5375.1
Note: The regressions are based on 2310 observations, 231 individuals and 77 groups. The bias
corrected and accelerated (BCa) condence intervals are based on non-parametric bootstraps with
500 replications. Sampling respects group composition. , ,  indicate signicance at levels
1%, 5% and 10%, based on the BCa condence intervals.
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This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for all treatments, separated
for stages 1 and 2.
B.1 Instructions - stage 1
The instructions for treatment S1-SeqNC incorporate all parts of the instructions common
to all treatments in stage 1. The instructions for treatment S1-SeqC can be obtained by
inserting and replacing the appropriate paragraphs. The placeholders [for treatment S1-
SeqC, insert paragraph < paragraph name > here] and [for treatment S1-SeqC, replace
the following paragraph] indicate which paragraphs have to be added or replaced, where
the replacement always has the same heading.
B.1.1 Instructions for treatment S1-SeqNC
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and
switch o your mobile!
You will receive e2.50 for showing up on time. Beyond this you can earn more money.
In order to do this, please read these instructions carefully. The e2.50 show-up fee and
any additional amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of
the experiment. Payments are carried out privately, i.e., without the other participants
knowing the extent of your earnings. During the experiment, we shall not speak of euros
but of ECU (Experimental Currency Units). ECU are converted to euros at the following
exchange rate: 1 ECU = e0:80.
The experiment consists of two parts. Some features of the experiment may change
from the rst to the second part. The instructions for the rst part follow on this page.
The instructions for the second part will be distributed after all participants have com-
pleted the rst part.
It is strictly forbidden to speak to other participants. If you have any questions during
the experiment please raise your hand.
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE FIRST PART
You will rst learn about the basic decision situation. The description about the experi-
ment in the rst part follows afterwards.
The Basic Decision Situation
Group formation
You will be placed in a group of three players. You will never learn the identity of the
other members of your group. Every group will be identied by an individual color.
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You (as well as the other members of your group) receive an endowment of 10 ECU. You
have to decide how many of these 10 ECU you want to contribute to a project.
The ECU contributed to the group project yield income for you as well as for the other
members of your group (you will learn more about the \income from the project" below).
You can keep the ECU that you do not contribute for yourself (they yield income just for
you).
[for treatments S1-SeqC, insert paragraph < Interaction with another group > here]
[for treatments S1-SeqC, replace the following paragraph]
Period earnings
More specically, in every period your earnings consist of two parts:
a) \Income from the project" = 0.5  sum of all group members' contributions (in
words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the sum of the
contributions of all group members by 0.5);
b) \ECU you keep" = 10   your contribution to the project.
Thus, your period earnings summarized in a formula are
Your period earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0:5  sum of group's contributions) + (10   your contribution)
Example:
Suppose that all three group members contribute 5 ECU. Then both you and your group
members receive an \income from the project" of 7.5 (= 0.5  15) ECU. The \ECU you
keep" are 5 (= 10   5). Hence, your period earnings are 7.5 + 5 = 12.5 ECU.
The Experiment In The First Part
Interaction with your group members
This part of the experiment consists of one period only. This period entails the following
two stages:
1. One group member decides prior to the others on his/her own contribution. In
the following, we shall refer to the group member who decides rst as the \early
contributor."
2. Without learning the \early contributor's" choice, the other two group members
decide simultaneously and privately on their own contributions. You will learn
about the format of these decisions below.
At the beginning of the rst part of the experiment, one member of each group is
randomly selected to be the \early contributor." Every participant will be informed
whether he or she is going to act as the \early contributor" in an \Information Window."
How you decide on your contribution
If you are the \early contributor," you enter your contribution in the following screen.
You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10.
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tribution for every possible contribution of the \early contributor." The screen on which
you will make your decisions is displayed below.
In each of the 11 boxes you have to indicate how many ECU you wish to contribute,
conditional on the \early contributor's" contribution printed on the left of each box. In
each box you can insert any integer from 0 to 10. Please bear in mind that the \early
contributor" already made his/her decision, which can not be revised. His/her choice
determines which of your decisions will actually count. However, since you do not know
his/her choice when making your decisions you will have to think carefully about all your
decisions because all can become relevant to your earnings. The following example should
clarify this.
Suppose that the \early contributor" decided to contribute 5 ECU to the project.
Suppose furthermore that you decided on your contributions as displayed in the table
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\early contributor's" decision 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
your contribution 0 10 0 7 8 8 0 3 2 8 0
Suppose furthermore, that the decisions of the third group member are identical to yours.
The decision that counts for both you and the third group member is the one for the
5 ECU contribution of the \early contributor." I.e. you both contribute 8 ECU to the
project. The sum of contributions thus equals 5 + 8 + 8 = 21 ECU.
The information you receive
You will receive no information about any decision at the end of the rst part of the ex-
periment. Only when the second part of the experiment is nished you will be informed
about the choices from the rst part. This information includes (1) the \early contribu-
tor's" decision, (2) the corresponding decisions of the two other group members, (3) the
income from the project, and [(in treatment S1-SeqC) (4) the total contributions in your
group and the group your's is paired with, and (5)] (4) your resulting period earnings.
Additional information on the overall experiment
Your nal payo
Your nal payo will be based on only one of the two parts of the experiment. The
payo relevant part will be randomly selected by the 
ip of a fair coin at the end of the
experiment (i.e., after everyone has nished the second part). The outcome of this coin

ip will be decisive for everyone. If the rst part of the experiment will be selected, you
are going to be payed your period earnings in this part in addition to the e2.50 show-up
fee. The coin 
ip is going to be conducted by one of the participants of the experiment.
To select the participant, one experimenter will draw a ball from an urn containing as
many balls as there are participants in the experiment.
Before the experiment starts, we ask you to answer some control questions, in order
to assure that all participants completely and correctly understood the rules of the ex-
periment. Once everybody has answered all questions correctly, six practice periods will
be played. During these six periods, you will not be matched with other persons in this
room, but with a computer that will determine randomly the others' decisions. You will
get no payment for these periods.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now. Please click on OK if you nished reading the instructions.
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Interaction with another group
Your group will be randomly paired with another group of three. After the contribution
decisions, the total (i.e., the sum of) contributions to the project of your group will be
compared with the total contributions to the project of the other group. The group with
the higher total contributions (or the \winning" group) receives a transfer from the group
with the lower total contributions (or the \losing" group). The \transfer you receive or
pay" depends on the dierence in total contributions between the two groups and each
group member will receive or pay an equal share of the transfer. You will learn more
about the \transfer you receive or pay" below.
Period earnings
More specically, in every period your earnings consist of three parts:
a) \Income from the project" = 0.4  sum of all group members' contributions (in
words, the income from the project is determined by multiplying the sum of the
contributions of all group members by 0.4);
b) \ECU you keep" = 10   your contribution to the project;
c) \Transfer you receive or pay" = 0.1  dierence in total contributions between your
group and the other group.
Thus, if you are a member of the winning group, your period earnings summa-
rized in a formula are
Your period earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0:4  sum of group's contributions) + (10   your contribution)
+ Transfer you receive
(0:1  dierence in total contributions)
If you are a member of the losing group, your period earnings summarized in a
formula are
Your period earnings = Income from the project + ECU you keep
(0:4  sum of group's contributions) + (10   your contribution)
  Transfer you pay
(0:1  dierence in total contributions)
Example:
Suppose that all three members of your group contribute 5 ECU and all three members of
the other group contribute 0 ECU. Then your group's total contributions are 3  5 ECU
= 15 ECU. The other group's total contributions are 3  0 ECU = 0 ECU. This means
that your group receives the transfer and the other group pays the transfer. The \transfer
you receive" is 1.5 (= 0:1  (15   0)) ECU. The \income from the project" equals 6 (=
0.4  15) ECU. The \ECU you keep" are 5 (= 10   5). Hence, your period earnings are
6 + 5 + 1.5 = 12.5 ECU.
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This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) for stage 2. Those for
treatment S2-SimNC are displayed below in full length. They contain all parts which are
common to all four treatments in this stage. The instructions for the other treatments can
be obtained by inserting and replacing the appropriate paragraphs. The place holder [for
treatment <treatment name>, replace the following paragraph] indicates which paragraphs
have to be replaced, where the replacement always has the same heading. The place holder
[for treatment <treatment name>, insert paragraph <paragraph name> here] prescribes
where new paragraphs have to be inserted.
B.2.1 Instructions for treatment S2-SimNC
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE SECOND PART
The Basic Decision Situation
In this second part you will face the same basic decision situation as in the rst part of
the experiment.
Group formation
The group composition is the same as in the rst part of the experiment. I.e. you are
again interacting with the same group members. [(in S2-SimC and S2-SeqC:) Also, the
group yours is interacting with is the same as in the rst part of the experiment.]
The Experiment In The Second Part
[for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, replace the following paragraph]
Interaction with your group members in each period
This part of the experiment consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of every period,
each group member receives an endowment of 10 ECU. In each period, you as well as the
other two members of your group decide simultaneously and privately about the amount
of ECUs you want to contribute to the project. The screen on which you will make your
decisions is displayed below. You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10.
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contribution> here]
[for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC, replace the following paragraph]
Your guess with respect to the own group
In every period, besides making your contribution decision, you have to make a guess.
The target is to guess the average contribution of the other two members of your group
(rounded to the next integer, 0.5 is rounded up). You will be paid for the accuracy of
your guesses as follows:
 If your guess is the same as the target, you earn 3 ECU.
 If your guess deviates by 1 ECU from the target, you earn 2 ECU.
 If your guess deviates by 2 ECU or more, you earn nothing.
[for treatments S2-SimC and S2-SeqC, insert paragraph <Your guess with respect to the
other group> here]
The information you receive after each period
After each period you will receive information about (1) the number of ECU contributed
by each of your group members [(in treatment S2-SimC and S2-SeqC) (1) the \early
contributor's" decision, (2) the corresponding decisions of the other two group members]
being sorted in descending order, (2) the income from the project, [(in treatment S2-SimC
and S2-SeqC) (4) the total contributions in your group and the group your's is paired with,]
(3) your resulting period-earnings, and (4) the earnings for the accuracy of your guess.
Your nal payo
If the second part of the experiment is selected for payment, you are going to be paid
according to one randomly selected period. For this period you will receive the sum of
your period earnings and the payo for the accuracy of your expectation [(in treatments
S2-SimC and S2-SeqC) both your expectations]. In order to determine which period is
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contains 10 balls, numbered from 1 to 10. The draw will be decisive for everyone.
Please remain quietly seated until the experiment starts. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand now. Please click on OK if you nished reading the instructions.
B.2.2 Additional instructions for treatments S2-SeqNC and S2-SeqC
Interaction with your group members in every period
This part of the experiment consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of every period, each
group member receives an endowment of 10 ECU. Each period consists of the same two
stages as in the rst part of the experiment. The positions within each group are the same
as in the rst part of the experiment. In particular, if you were the \early contributor"
in the rst part, you are going to be the \early contributor" in the second part as well.
How you decide on your contribution
If you are the \early contributor," you enter your contribution in the following screen.
You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10.
If you are not the \early contributor," you are not going to be asked to indicate your
contribution for every possible contribution of the \early contributor" like in the rst part
of the experiment. Instead, you are informed about the \early contributor's" decision.
Afterwards you can choose your own contribution. The screen on which you will make your
decisions is displayed below, where the \X" is the placeholder for the \early contributor's"
choice. You can insert any integer number from 0 to 10.
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In every period, besides making your contribution decision, you have to make a guess
about the following target.
 If you are the \early contributor," the target is to guess the average contribution of
the other two group members (rounded to the next integer, 0.5 is rounded up).
 If you are not the \early contributor," the target is to guess the contribution of the
other group member who is in the same position as you.
You will be paid for the accuracy of your guesses as follows:
 If your guess is the same as the target, you earn 3 ECU.
 If your guess deviates by 1 ECU from the target, you earn 2 ECU.
 If your guess deviates by 2 ECU or more, you earn nothing.
B.2.3 Additional instructions for treatments S2-SimC and S2-SeqC
Your guess with respect to the other group
In every period you also have to guess the average contribution of the group yours is
compared with (rounded to the next integer). You will be paid for the accuracy of your
guesses as follows:
 If your guess is the same as the other group's average contribution, you earn 3 ECU.
 If your guess deviates by 1 ECU from the other group's average contribution, you
earn 2 ECU.
 If your guess deviates by 2 ECU or more, you earn nothing.
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